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Abstract 
This article investigates the use of strategic contract clauses such as most-favored-customer 
clauses, rights of first refusal, rights of first offer, first negotiation rights in bio-tech R&D 
contracts between pharmaceutical firms and bio-tech agents. It is shown that these strategic 
rights are more likely adopted when potential entry threat from other pharmaceutical firms are 
larger. This result is consistent with the prediction from the literature: strategic contracts can 
increase the joint benefit of contracting parties by extracting rent from entrants and/or protect 
investments by contracting parties. Furthermore, strategic rights and termination rights held by 
pharmaceutical firms are shown to be substitutes, and the level of substitution is affected by the 
uncertainty of the R&D activities involved and the previous relationship between contracting 
parties. These results can be explained by a multi-task theory where bio-tech agents allocate 
effort between R&D activities specified in contracts and non-contracted R&D activities.   
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1. Introduction  
 Strategic contracts are widely adopted in various industries for sales, acquisitions, and 
strategic alliances. As shown by the literature following Aghion and Bolton (1987), a common 
feature of strategic contracts is that they can extract more rent from potential entrants and/or 
protect investments taken by contracting parties. In reality, many contract clauses can have such 
strategic effects.  
For examples, breakup fees are often designed to prevent contracting parties from breaching 
their contracts, and therefore such clauses can force entrants to offer better deals in negotiating 
with one of the initial contracting parties. Most-favored-customer clause and the right of first 
refusal signed between a seller of an asset and a buyer typically specify that, if the seller receives 
an offer from another buyer, he must inform the initial buyer, who has the right to obtain the 
asset by matching the outside offer. A related but different clause, the right of first offer, often 
requires that the seller should first make an offer to the initial buyer, and if the buyer rejects, the 
seller can look for other buyers but cannot sell the asset at more favorable terms than the offer 
made to the initial buyer. There are also clauses such as the right of first negotiation, which only 
requires the seller to negotiate first with the right holder before searching for other buyers, but 
does not set any restriction on the terms of sales. Except for breakup fees, the above strategic 
contract clauses and other similar clauses are commonly employed in R&D agreements between 
pharmaceutical firms and bio-tech agents, regarding the sales of licensing rights for R&D 
discoveries not specified in their initial contracts.  
Although there is a large theoretical literature on strategic contracts, empirical studies have 
been very limited.2 In this paper, we provide both theoretical and empirical analysis of strategic 
contracts. We formulate a multi-task model where an agent can allocate effort between one R&D 
activity specified by the contract between the agent and a client, and another non-contracted 
R&D activity. A potential entrant may compete for the licensing right of non-contracted R&D 
discoveries. We show theoretically that strategic contracts not only help the contracting parties to 
extract more rent from the entrant, but also mitigate multi-task agency problems by reducing the 
agent’s outside option. These effects imply that strategic contracts are more likely adopted when 
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there is (larger) entry threat. We also show the substitution between strategic contract rights and 
unconditional termination rights which allow the client to terminate the R&D project.  
Following the model predictions, we conduct empirical analysis on the adoption of strategic 
rights, using a rich dataset of R&D agreements between pharmaceutical firms and bio-tech 
agents. We construct a dummy variable, as the main dependent variable, to capture whether an 
agreement contains strategic rights. We also create two other dependent variables reflecting the 
different strength levels of various strategic rights. For each agreement about R&D activities of a 
certain disease type, several entry threat measures are created based on other pharmaceutical 
firms’ R&D projects and clinical trials of the same disease type in the previous years, and based 
on Herfindahl index (HHI) of generic drugs of the same disease type.  
In the first part of empirical analysis, after controlling characteristics of projects, clients and 
agents, we show that entry threat significantly increases the adoption of strategic rights in R&D 
agreements. The adoption of strategic rights by a client and an agent is also influenced by the 
client size, the agent’s R&D experience, and whether the client and the agent have previous 
relationship in R&D cooperation.  
In the second part of empirical analysis, we also consider unconditional termination rights 
which allow pharmaceutical clients to terminate R&D projects without any justification. It is 
shown that there is a negative relationship between the adoption of unconditional termination 
rights and the adoption of strategic rights. Strategic rights and termination rights are substitutes 
in addressing multi-task agency problems. We also find that such substitution becomes more 
pronounced in early R&D stages when there is larger uncertainty. Similarly, such substitution 
becomes more pronounced when contracting parties have previous relationship in R&D 
cooperation. Previous relationship between contracting parties allows for more information 
learning about agents’ ability and behavior, so that clients are more likely to observe 
intermediate (or more accurate) signals about the progress of R&D projects. In such scenarios, 
termination rights are more effective in motivating agents. Therefore, the potential benefits of 
using strategic rights are smaller.  
We also discuss alternative theories such as uncertainty, asymmetric information and 
screening, and relational contracts which may explain some but not all of the empirical results.   
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Our paper mainly contributes to the literature on strategic contracts. Contracts can be used as 
strategic tools to deter entry or to extract rent from entrants (Aghion and Bolton, 1987). Strategic 
contracts could also preserve incentive for relationship-specific investments (Rogerson, 1984, 
1992; Chung, 1991; Spier and Whinston, 1995; Che and Chung, 1999; Che and Hausch, 1999; 
Segal and Whinston, 2000; Che and Lewis, 2007) or facilitate trade by imposing lower values on 
outside options (Hua 2007; Matouschek and Ramezzana, 2007). Many of the above studies focus 
on the effects of breakup fees and termination penalties. Choi (2009) show that he right of first 
refusal could strategically extract rent from future buyers, but cause asset misallocation. Other 
studies on the right of first refusal and right of first offer include work by Bikhchandani, 
Lippman, and Ryan (2005),  Kahan, Leshem, and Sundaram (2008), Grosskopf and Roth (2009), 
and Hua (2012). There are also studies on most-favored-customer clauses (Butz, 1990; Cooper 
and Fries, 1991; Neilson and Winter, 1994; Spier, 2003, and Daughety and Reinganum, 2004). 
Our paper contributes to the above literature in two dimensions. First, we show theoretically that 
strategic contracts not only extract more rent from entrants, but also mitigate multi-task agency 
problems. Second, and more importantly, our paper is the first study providing empirical 
evidence about the adoption of various strategic rights in contracts, as well as the relationship 
between strategic rights and termination rights.  
There is limited literature on empirical analysis of contracts. Lafontaine and Slade (2008) 
summarize the empirical findings on exclusive contracts and competitiveness in markets. An 
interesting study by Lafontaine (1992) tests various agency-theoretic explanations for franchising, 
including risk sharing, one-sided moral hazard, and two-sided moral hazard models. She finds 
that the two-sided moral hazard model explains the data best.3 Gil and Marion (2013) show that 
informal and relationship contracts lead to more entry and lower bids in the highway 
procurement market. A few empirical studies (Lerner and Merges, 1997; Arrunada, Garicano, 
and Vazquez, 2001; Elfenbein and Lerner, forthcoming) have examined allocation of control 
rights in contracts. Lerner and Ulrike (2010) provide important evidence on incomplete contracts. 
By using data from bio-tech R&D agreements, they show that less contractibility of R&D 
activities leads to more adoption of termination rights. Our paper uses a similar source of data. 
Different from the literature, our paper mainly addresses the adoption of strategic contract. 
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 Fan, Kuhn, and Lafontaine (2013) provide evidence that potential franchisees’ financial constraints affect 
franchisors’ entry into franchising. 
5 
 
Our paper is also related to the literature on stage financing and project termination in 
venture capital investments. As predicted by the theoretical literature, stage financing can 
motivate agents to exert effort or mitigate entrepreneurs’ hold-up problems (Neher, 1999; 
Cornelli and Yosha, 2003). Option to terminate the venture may also screen out low-quality 
projects (Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995; Qian and Xu, 1998). Information learning in stage 
financing is valuable for venture capitalists to make decisions (Bergemann and Hege, 1998). 
Empirical examinations justify the linkage between agency issues and stage financing strategies 
(Gompers, 1995; Kaplan and Stromberg, 2003; Bergemann et al, 2009). In our paper, the role of 
unconditional termination rights held by pharmaceutical clients is similar to that of stage 
financing, in solving agency issues. However, our paper focuses more on strategic rights, and the 
substitution between termination and strategic rights, which have not been studies before.   
Section 2 presents the theoretical model and derives predictions about the usage of strategic 
rights. Section 3 describes the data. The empirical specification and results are discussed in 
Section 4. Section 5 checks the robustness of the results by using alternative measures of entry 
threat and discusses some alternative theories. And Section 6 provides the concluding remarks.  
 
2. Model and Predictions 
There are two risk-neutral players as initial contracting parties in the model: a client P, and 
an agent A. With probability  > 0, there is another risk-neutral firm E as the potential entrant. 
The client P hires the agent A to conduct a R&D project C and devotes initial investment I, 
which is essential for any research activity. Given the nature of the project C, the corresponding 
R&D outcome is verifiable and contractible. After receiving the initial investment, however, the 
agent has limited time and therefore can choose his effort  ∈ {,	} between two types of 
R&D activities: the activity C which may result in the contracted R&D discovery, and another 
activity NC which may result in a non-contracted R&D discovery.4 For example, in reality, a 
bio-tech agent can use the initial investment to look for some discoveries which are not the initial 
objectives of the R&D project C. The initial contract between the client P and the agent A cannot 
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 For simplicity, we assume that the agent can only take effort in one of the two activities. Alternatively, the agent’s 
effort for each activity can be  ∈ {0,1}, under the constraint that his total effort is 1. The intuition of our results 
holds with continuous effort choices.  
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specify all such potential discoveries. And the linkage between investments by P and the 
discoveries from Project NC is not verifiable. There is no difference in the agent’s effort costs 
between the two types of activities. For simplicity, assume that the agent’s effort costs are small 
enough and therefore can be ignored in the analysis. Agent A’s effort choice cannot be observed 
by the other players.  
If the agent chooses  =  , with probability  > 0 , Project C is successful; and 
independently with probability  < , Project NC is successful and results in a non-contracted 
discovery.  
If the agent chooses  = 	 , with probability  > 0 , Project NC is successful; and 
independently with probability  < , Project C is successful.  
Since the R&D outcome from Project C is contractible, the initial contract can specify who, P 
or A, owns the property right of the R&D discovery from Project C. To capture the reality that 
R&D agents lack the necessary production and marketing resources, we assume that the 
realization of any benefit from the R&D discovery requires inputs from P or E. In addition, we 
assume that, given its investment I, the client P can make a take-it-or-leave-it contract offer to 
the agent A regarding Project C.5   If the contract licenses the property right of the R&D 
discovery to P, the potential entrant E cannot compete to obtain the discovery. Conditional on the 
success of Project C, for any firm, the expected market value of the R&D discovery is  > 0, 
which is a fixed number and greater than the initial investment I.  
In contrast, the R&D discovery from Project NC, if any, is observable by all players but not 
contractible in the initial contract. Therefore, if the potential entrant E exists, she may enter to 
compete for the license of the non-contracted R&D discovery. Conditional on the success of 
Project NC, the expected market values of the R&D discovery from Project NC are  for the 
client P and  for the entrant E respectively.   and  are independent and follow the same 
distribution () on [, ], with monotone hazard rate: () = (1 − ()) ()⁄  is decreasing 
in . Although the distribution is commonly known to all players,  is privately observed by P 
and  is privately observed by E, after the R&D outcome is realized.  
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 This assumption simplifies the theoretical analysis. Our results still hold when A also has some bargaining power.  
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In reality, the outcome from non-contracted R&D activities is more uncertain and 
correspondingly has smaller expected value than the intended R&D outcome from contracted 
R&D activities. We assume that  >  =   max( , )
"
"
"
"
#($)#(). It is socially more 
efficient and also more jointly beneficial for P and A to devote effort into Project C than into 
Project NC. 
It is easy to see the potential conflicts between the client P and the agent A. Since the 
research discovery from Project NC is non-contracted, it is possible to have more competition 
over the corresponding licensing right. Given the potential competition between P and E, the 
agent may expect to receive more revenue from Project NC than Project C. In theory, P can offer 
a high payment contingent on the success of Project C, in order to motivate the agent to devote 
his effort in Project C. However, this high contingent payment may be too costly for P.  
In the following, we will first describe the timing of the basic model where the client P 
cannot terminate the R&D project. Then we will generalize the model to include the possibility 
for P to observe some intermediate signals and terminate the project. 
The Basic Model and Analysis 
For simplicity, assume that, if any project is not successful, the expected market value for 
that project is zero. The timing of the basic model is as follows:   
At Date 1, P and A have symmetric information. P offers a take-it-or-leave-it contract to A. 
The contract can include an upfront transfer %&	from P to A (in addition to the initial investment 
I), the ownership or licensing right () ∈ {*, +} of the discovery from Project C, an ex post 
payment % from P to A conditional on the success of Project C. The contract offer may also 
include a direct or indirect mechanism regarding the sales of the licensing right (,) ∈ {*, +} of 
any non-contracted R&D discovery by A from Project NC. Adding such a mechanism would 
increase contracting and enforcement costs for P and A by - > 0. If A accepts this contract, P 
makes the upfront transfer and initial investment. However, P is financially constrained by . + 0 
and therefore %& ≤ 0. If A rejects the contract, there is no R&D activity.  
At Date 2, A chooses unobservable effort  ∈ {,	}.  
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At Date 3, Projects C and NC may succeed or fail. When Project NC is successful, E enters 
with probability . If the initial contract has specified a selling mechanism, the allocation of the 
licensing right is determined by the mechanism; otherwise, the allocation of the licensing right is 
determined by a standard first-price or second-price auction. 
In reality, R&D agreements often use specific strategic rights such as most-favored licensee, 
right of first refusal, right of first offer, right of first consideration, for the sales of the licensing 
right of any non-contracted R&D discovery. In the analysis, however, we use the mechanism 
design approach to characterize the optimal contract which maximizes the joint benefits of P and 
A. The similar analysis has been done by Hua (2007), showing that the above-mentioned specific 
strategic rights have similar features as the optimal contract.6 In particular, the optimal contract 
would specify a direct revelation mechanism to be used at date 3. If Project NC succeeds and E 
enters, then both P and E are asked to report their values of the discovery from Project NC. 
Given their reports   and , the mechanism specifies winning probabilities for P and E,  and 
ex post payments from P and E to A.  
As a benchmark, assume that the contract at Date 1 does not include any mechanism for the 
sales of the licensing right of non-contracted R&D discoveries. Then if E enters, the allocation of 
the licensing right of non-contracted R&D discoveries between P and E would be determined by 
the standard first-price or second-price auction.  
 
Proposition 1: Assume that the contract does not include any selling mechanism for discoveries 
from Project NC. (1) Under the optimal contract, P obtains the licensing right  () , i.e.,  () = *. 
(2) If E does not enter, P always obtains the licensing right (,) . If E enters, when P’s virtual 
utility,  − (1 − ($) ($)⁄ , is greater than E’s virtual utility,  − (1 − () ()⁄ , P 
wins the licensing right (,); otherwise E wins the licensing right (,) .  
Proof: As shown in the literature on mechanism design.  
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 In this paper, we assume that P, as one of the potential buyers of the licensing right, makes the initial contract offer. 
In contrast, Hua (2007) assumes that a unique seller makes the initial contract offer. However, it can be shown that 
the optimal contract derived in Hua (2007) also maximizes the joint benefit of the contracting parties. Thus, the 
analysis can be applied to the current model.  
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Now consider the contract which includes a mechanism for the sales of the licensing right of 
non-contracted R&D discoveries from Project NC. The following proposition characterizes the 
allocation of licensing rights under the optimal contract.  
 
Proposition 2: Assume that the contract can include a selling mechanism for discoveries from 
Project NC. (1) Under the optimal contract, P always obtains the licensing right  () , i.e.,  
() = *. (2) There exists a unique value 2 = 2(0), where 2(0)	is less than 1 and non-increasing 
in 0. Under the optimal contract, if P’s 2-adjusted virtual utility,  − 2(1 − ($) ($)⁄ , is 
greater than E’s virtual utility,  − (1 − () ()⁄ , P wins the licensing right (,) ; 
otherwise E wins the licensing right (,) .  
Proof: As shown by Hua (2007).  
 
Propositions 1 and 2 lead to the following comparisons:  
Corollary 1: Compared to the benchmark case, when the contract includes a selling mechanism 
for non-contracted R&D discoveries from Project NC, (1) the optimal mechanism has a strategic 
effect which reduces E’s winning probability; (2) conditional on the existence of a non-
contracted R&D discovery, the joint expected benefit of P and A from the non-contracted 
discovery is larger; and (3) the expected revenue for A from selling the licensing right of the 
non-contracted discovery becomes smaller.  
 
The above results imply that P and A may specify a strategic selling mechanism to make P 
more likely to obtain the licensing right of non-contracted R&D discoveries and to increase the 
joint benefit of P and A by extracting more rent from E. In addition, by reducing the agent’s 
expected revenue from non-contracted discoveries, such a mechanism also creates more 
incentive for A to devote his effort in the contracted project C instead of in the non-contracted 
project NC, which are jointly beneficial for P and A. Of course, including such a strategic 
mechanism would increase the contracting or enforcement costs for P and A by - > 0. Therefore, 
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P would offer a contract including such strategic mechanisms only when the probability to have 
entry threat is large enough and the contracting/enforcement costs are small enough.  
 
Proposition 3: There exists a cut-off value -3 > 0. Given any contracting and enforcement costs 
satisfying - < -3 ,  there exists  4(-) > 0 such that, if the probability for E to enter satisfies 
 > 4(-), P has incentive to include the optimal strategic selling mechanism for the licensing 
right of non-contracted discoveries.  
Proof: To be added.  
 
The Generalized Model and Analysis 
In the above basic model, we assume that P can never terminate the R&D project. In reality, 
however, clients often hold some (unconditional) termination rights. After observing some 
intermediate signals about the progress of R&D projects, clients can exercise termination rights. 
Intuitively, such termination rights motivate agents to devote more effort into contracted R&D 
activities. Therefore, termination rights and strategic contract mechanisms can be substitutes. In 
reality, both termination rights and strategic rights are choice variables in contract design. 
However, in this paper, we only illustrate the correlation between these two contract terms, 
instead of charactering the optimal contract. Thus, we assume that the initial contract has given P 
an unconditional termination right. We then generalize our basic model by adding another 
intermediate stage between Date 2 and Date 3:  
At Date 2.5, after A takes effort, with probability 5 < 1, P can observe a non-verifiable 
signal 6 ∈ {, 	}  which perfectly reveals the agent A’s effort choice. Then P can decide 
whether to terminate Project C. If terminated, Project C results in a residual value 7 which is 
obtained by P. If not terminated, then the game proceeds to Date 3. The following lemma shows 
a sufficient condition for P to exercise the termination right. 
 
Lemma 1: If 7 >  +  	, P would terminate the project when observing a signal 6 = 	 . 
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The full-fledged analysis of the generalized model is complex. However, we can show that, if 
the termination right is more effective in motivating A to choose effort  = , then potential 
benefit for P and A using strategic mechanisms is smaller: 
 
Proposition 4: Assume that 	- < -3 ,  > 4(-) , and 7 >  +  	 . If terminate right is not 
included, then P and A adopt the strategic selling mechanism for non-contracted R&D 
discoveries. If termination right is included in the contract, there exist a cut-off value 54 and a 
cut-off value -8 < -3	such that, if contracting costs satisfy -8 < - < -3	and the probability for P to 
observe the signal s satisfies	5 > 54, then in their contract, P and A does not adopt the strategic 
selling mechanism for non-contracted R&D discoveries.  
Proof: To be added.  
Proposition 4 illustrates the substitution between termination rights and strategic rights. 
Furthermore, if the client and the agent have previous relationship in R&D cooperation, 
information learning allows the client to know more about the agent’s ability and behavior. 
Correspondingly, the client is more likely to observe the signal s (alternatively, the signal is more 
informative about the agent’s effort choice). That is, in our model, 5 would be larger. Then 
Proposition 4 implies that, when P and A have previous relationship, the substitution between 
strategic rights and termination rights becomes more pronounced.   
The substitution between termination rights and strategic rights may also be affected by the 
uncertainty of R&D activities, though we do not model uncertainty explicitly. Intuitively, if there 
is larger uncertainty, the likelihood of finding contracted discoveries would become smaller. 
Thus, P is more likely to exercise the termination right when observing a signal 6 = 	 . Given 
that the termination right becomes more effective in motivating the agent, the benefit of using 
strategic rights to mitigate multi-task problems is smaller. That is, the substitution between 
termination rights and strategic rights would become more pronounced.  
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The theoretical analysis leads to the following predictions, which we will test empirically in 
the following sections:  
Prediction 1: When there is larger probability to have entry threat from other firms, the initial 
R&D agreement is more likely to adopt strategic rights.  
Prediction 2.1: The (unconditional) termination rights held by the client and the strategic rights 
are substitutes.  
Prediction 2.2: The substitution between termination rights and strategic rights is more 
pronounced when there is larger uncertainty of R&D activities.  
Prediction 2.3: The substitution between termination rights and strategic rights is more 
pronounced when the client and the agent have previous relationship in R&D cooperation. 
 
3. Data  
To test the adoption of strategic rights, we obtain a data set of R&D agreements between 
pharmaceutical firms and bio-tech agents, collected by Deloitte Recap (Recap), which identifies 
and analyzes critical terms in bio-tech contracts. Given the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
imposed by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Recap has access to 
unpublished R&D agreements in the bio-tech industry. The company has also collected 
information about redacted agreements from SEC filings and news.  
The full data set we obtained from Recap includes 29994 bio-tech R&D agreements, signed 
during the period from 1974 to 2009. Within this data set, there are 1703 agreements having all 
contract details. Among these agreements, we took the following selection process:  
First, some agreements have been included twice in the Recap dataset mistakenly. We 
eliminated such duplicate agreements. Second, we eliminated those agreements which did not 
involve any R&D activity. Third, agreements with three or more bio-tech agents were eliminated, 
because there would be too much heterogeneity among agents. We kept a few agreements with 
two bio-tech agents and took the average of the agents’ characteristics when necessary.  
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The above selection process ended up with 1586 agreements with contract details.  
Dependent Variables 
We are interested in the adoption of strategic rights in R&D agreements. However, the Recap 
dataset does not summarize such information. We and our research assistants have read all the 
above agreements in details, in order to identify the different strategic rights and other useful 
terms. As summarized in Table 1, among 351 out of the 1586 agreements (about 22.1%) 
included strategic rights regarding non-contracted R&D discoveries not specified in the initial 
agreements. We create a dummy as one dependent variable: 
 “Strategic Right (Binary)” equals 1 if an agreement includes any strategic right and 0 
otherwise.  
Furthermore, different types of strategic rights may impose various restrictions on sales of 
non-contracted discoveries. For example, under the most-favored-customer/licensee clause and 
the right of first refusal, initial pharmaceutical clients should be offered the same terms of sales 
as bio-tech agents have received from entrants, and they have priority over entrants in getting 
non-contracted discoveries. In contrast, the right of negotiation or first discussion only asks bio-
tech agents to negotiate first with initial clients, but does not impose any restriction on future 
sales if their negotiations do not succeed. To capture such variation in the strength of strategic 
rights, we create two other dependent variables as described below:  
“Strategic Right 1” equals 2 if an agreement includes “most-favored 
licensee/company/supplier(MFN)”, “right of first refusal”, or “right of first offer”, 1 if an 
agreement includes any other strategic right (e.g. “right of negotiation” or “right of first 
discussion/negotiation/consideration”), and 0 if no strategic contract term is included.  
“Strategic Right 2” equals 2 if an agreement includes “most-favored 
licensee/company/supplier/MFN” or right of first refusal”, 1 if an agreement includes any other 
strategic right (e.g. “right of negotiation”, “right of first discussion/negotiation/consideration”, or 
“right of first offer”), and 0 if no strategic contract term is included.   
The difference in the above two variable definitions is about the right of first offer, which 
specifies that a bio-tech agent should first make a sales offer about non-contracted discoveries to 
14 
 
the initial client, and if the offer is rejected, the agent can sell the discoveries to other firms with 
sales terms no more favorable than the previous offer. The right of first offer differs from the 
right of first negotiation which does not impose restrictions on terms of sales. But it also differs 
from most-favored licensee clause and the right of first refusal which also give information 
advantage to initial clients. Therefore, theoretically there is some ambiguity on whether the right 
of first offer has the same strong strategic effects.  
Entry Threat Measures 
This paper tries to investigate how entry threat from other firms affects the adoption of 
strategic rights. We need to construct measures for entry threat. However, there is large 
heterogeneity in business scope among pharmaceutical firms and the number of pharmaceutical 
firms does not change by much over time. Therefore, we cannot simply count the number of 
pharmaceutical firms. Instead, we use the following approach to create measures for entry threat.  
In the Recap data, each agreement is involved with R&D activities of certain disease types. 
There are 21 disease types in total, as shown in the following list: allergic, autoimmune 
inflammatory, bone, cancer, cardiovascular, central nervous system, dental oral, dermatologic, 
endocrinological & metabolic, gastrointestinal, genitourinary gynecologic, hematologic, 
infectious-bacterial, infectious-miscellaneous, infectious-viral, ophthalmic, psychiatric, renal, 
respiratory, transplantation, and other miscellaneous. 
For a particular R&D project with a certain disease type, it is more likely that the non-
contracted discoveries are of the same disease type. Thus, those pharmaceutical firms which 
have business or previous R&D experience of the same disease type are more likely to enter and 
compete for those non-contracted discoveries.7 Using the 29994 agreements in the full Recap 
dataset, we construct the first entry threat measure: 
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 Firms with interests and expertise in a certain type of disease are more likely to become entrants competing for 
discoveries of that type. This is reasonable in the pharmaceutical industry: without relevant experience and expertise, 
it is difficult for a pharmaceutical firm to develop and sell medicines for a certain type of disease.   
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For a particular agreement, “R&D project (same type)”, as entry threat measure 1, equals 1 if 
in all previous years other pharmaceutical firms have taken R&D projects of the same disease 
type as the particular agreement involves, and equals 0 otherwise.8   
From Recap, we also obtained another dataset about the clinical trials and their disease types 
filed by pharmaceutical firms to the US Food and Drug Commission (FDC). If there have been 
clinical trials filed by other pharmaceutical firms for a particular disease type, it is more likely to 
have entrants competing for R&D discoveries of the same disease type. Therefore, based on this 
dataset, we construct another entry threat measure:  
For a particular agreement, “clinical trial (same type)”, as entry threat measure 2, equals 1 if 
in all previous years other pharmaceutical firms have filed clinical trials of the same disease type 
as the particular agreement involves, and equals 0 otherwise.9  
Note that both “R&D project (same type)” and “clinical trial (same type)” are dummy 
variables.10 That is, we care more about the existence of potential entry threat but do not consider 
the numbers of previous R&D projects or clinical trials of the same disease type. In Section 5, 
we will show the robustness of our empirical results by using alternative entry threat measures 
based on the numbers of other pharmaceutical firms’ previous R&D projects or clinical trials and 
measures based on the numbers of other pharmaceutical firms which have done R&D projects or 
clinical trials of the same disease type.  
The Newsmagazine for Pharmacists has been publishing sales of top 200 generic and 
branded drugs each year since year 2000. We identified the disease types for each drug. Then 
based on sales of generic drugs, we calculate Herfindahl Index (HHI) for the market of each 
disease type. If HHI is larger, the market tends to be more concentrated with larger firms. 
Correspondingly, for R&D agreements of the same disease type, entry threat tends to be larger. 
                                                            
8
 Pharmaceutical firms which conduct R&D projects of the same type in more recent years may bring larger entry 
threat. We have also tried alternative constructions for the “R&D project (same type)” by checking other firms’ 
R&D projects in the previous year, previous 2 years, previous 3 years, and previous 5 years before the contracting 
year. The empirical results are robust under these alternative constructions.   
9
 Some clinical trials filed may fail to result in final products. However, those firms which had failed their clinical 
trials can also become entry threats in competing for R&D discoveries of the same disease type.  
10
 The two measures have different advantages. “R&D project (same type)” covers R&D projects with different 
stages of drug development, but does not include research projects done by pharmaceutical firms alone (without 
agents). “Clinical trial (same type)” captures both trials jointly conducted by pharmaceutical firms and agents, and 
trials conducted by pharmaceutical firms alone. 
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For a particular agreement, “HHI (same type)”, as entry threat measure 3, is calculated based 
on sales of top generic drugs of the same disease type in the year when the particular agreement 
was signed.  
We only have the information on HHI (same type) from 2000 to 2009. When using this entry 
threat measure, the number of data observations will be reduced substantially.  
As a remark, in the Recap data, some of the agreements included R&D activities of more 
than one disease type. For such agreements, we adjust the above three entry threat measures by 
including all disease types involved.   
Other Variables 
We are also interested in the relationship between strategic rights and unconditional 
termination rights held by clients. In the Recap data, almost all agreements have given 
pharmaceutical clients certain termination rights, some with conditions and others without any 
condition. About 34.88% of the agreements included unconditional termination rights held by 
pharmaceutical clients. Intuitively, unconditional termination rights provide stronger incentive 
for bio-tech agents to devote effort in the contracted R&D projects. Thus, we construct the 
following dummy variable: 
“Termination right” equals 1 if an agreement includes unconditional termination right held 
by pharmaceutical clients, and 0 otherwise. When there is no ambiguity, sometimes we simply 
use the term “termination” for unconditional termination right.  
As discussed in Section 2, previous cooperation between pharmaceutical clients and bio-tech 
agents can facilitate information learning, which may affect the relationship between strategic 
rights and termination rights. In the full Recap dataset, for any particular agreement, “previous 
relationship” is defined as 1 if the pharmaceutical client and the bio-tech agent have cooperated 
in previous R&D projects and 0 otherwise.11  
                                                            
11
 We have also tried alternative constructions for “previous relationship” by looking at whether a pharmaceutical 
client and a bio-tech agent have cooperated in the previous 3 years or 5 years before entering into the current 
agreement. The empirical results are robust.  
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The relationship between strategic rights and termination rights may also be influenced by 
the uncertainty level of R&D projects. Bio-tech R&D projects are often associated with certain 
stages of developments. In order of timing, the typical stages include discovery (earliest test on 
some chemicals), lead molecule (identified possible development directions), preclinical (test on 
animals), phase I (starting test on human), phase II (small scale test on human), phase III (large 
scale test on human), formulation (final drug). The first two, discovery and lead molecule stages, 
involve more uncertainties. Thus, for any particular agreement, “stage”, as a measure for 
uncertainty, is defined as 0 if the agreement only involves R&D activities in the discovery and / 
or molecule stages and 1 otherwise.12  
Finally, we also include the following control variables. 
For any publicly listed pharmaceutical firm, “client size” is calculated as the log of total asset 
in the contracting year.  “ROA” is calculated as the net earnings (EBITDA) divided by total asset 
in the contracting year. 13 “ROA” reflects the financial status of the client while “client size” 
affects the pharmaceutical client’s bargaining power when negotiating with the bio-tech agent. 
The data source for both “client size” and “ROA” is Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS).  
As a proxy for an agent’s research ability and experience, “agent’s R&D experience” is 
defined as the number of R&D projects that the agent has conducted in all previous years based 
on the 29994 agreements in the full Recap dataset.  
To control other contract or R&D project characteristics, we use “project size (in million 
USD)” and “royalty rate” provided in the Recap dataset.  
Since our dataset covers a long period from 1974 to 2009, we construct two timing dummies: 
“period 90-99” equals 1 if an agreement was signed during 1990-1999 and 0 otherwise; “period 
00-09” equals 1 if an agreement was signed during 2000-2009 and 0 otherwise.  
Table 1 provides the summary statistics for all the variables.  
(Insert Table 1 here) 
                                                            
12
 In our dataset, a few agreements included activities in several different stages.  
13
 EBITDA: earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization.  
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4. Empirical Results  
As suggested in the introduction and model predictions, we are interested in two general 
questions in the empirical analysis. First, how entry threat from other firms affects the adoption 
of strategic rights in R&D agreements? Second, what is the relationship between strategic rights 
and termination rights held by clients? And what factors may influence the above relationship? 
In the following, we will first describe the econometric specifications and summarize the 
empirical findings about the first research questions. Then we will turn to the second question.  
 
Strategic Right and Entry Threat   
In this subsection, we will test Prediction 1 derived in Section 2: When there is larger 
probability to have entry threat from other pharmaceutical firms, the initial R&D contract is 
more likely to include strategic rights. Since we have three different measures for entry threat, 
we will run regressions independently with each measure. In Table 2, we use entry threat 
measure 1, i.e., other pharmaceutical firms’ previous “R&D project (same type)”. In Table 3, we 
use entry threat measure 2, i.e., other pharmaceutical firms’ previous “clinical trial (same type)”. 
In Table 4, we use the “HHI (same type)” for top generic drugs.  
In our analysis, there is no reverse causality problem that the adoption of strategic rights 
might affect the likelihood of entry threat, due to two reasons. First, the entry threat measures are 
based on data in previous years before a certain agreement was signed, so there is some time lag. 
Second, most R&D contracts were confidential and could not be observed by other firms.  
In each of these tables, there are three panels. The first panel (columns 1 and 2) follows logit 
specifications with the dummy variable “strategic right (binary)” as the dependent variable. The 
second panel (columns 3 and 4) and the third panel (columns 5 and 6) follow ordered logit 
specifications with “strategic right 1” and “strategic right 2” as the dependent variable 
respectively. In each panel, we start with the basic regression only controlling for project 
characteristics and then present the full regression controlling for characteristics of projects, 
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pharmaceutical clients, and bio-tech agents. We explain the role of each control variable in more 
details below.  
First, to capture possible time trend in the usage of strategic rights, in all specifications, we 
include two timing dummies, “period 90-99” and “period 00-09”. We do not use dummy 
variables for each year, given the limited data observations.  
Second, if a pharmaceutical client starts a project with larger investment size, it may have 
more concerns about potential entry threat and bargain more aggressively for the inclusion of 
strategic rights. And royalty rate can affect the alignment between the client’s and the agent’s 
interests in the contracted R&D activity. Thus, we control “project size” and “royalty rate”.  
Third, there may be an endogeneity problem that pharmaceutical clients choose to cooperate 
only with bio-tech agents with more experience and better reputation. It may also be easier for a 
client to enter into R&D agreements with a bio-tech agent, if they have cooperated in other 
projects before. In particular, such previous cooperation can help the client to learn more 
information about the agent’s ability and behavior. Such information learning mitigates 
asymmetric information between these two contracting parties and also reduces contracting costs. 
To capture all these effects, we include “agent’s R&D experience” to control agents’ experience 
and reputation, and include “previous relationship” to capture information learning.  
Fourth, if a pharmaceutical client has larger size, it tends to acquire more bargaining power 
when negotiating with a bio-tech agent. To capture clients’ bargaining power, we include “client 
size” in our analysis. In addition, a client’s financial performance or status can affect its 
competition with potential entrants for non-contracted R&D discoveries. So, we use “client’s 
ROA” as a proxy for its financial performance.  
(Insert Table 2 here) 
(Insert Table 3 here) 
(Insert Table 4 here) 
Now we discuss the empirical findings. Most importantly, in Table 2 and Table 3, when we 
use “R&D project (same type)” and “clinical trial (same type)” as entry threat measures, in all 
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specifications, the coefficient on entry threat measure is positive and statistically significant. The 
effect from entry threat is also economically significant. In particular, based on the results in 
Column 2 of Table 2, it can be calculated that, when the entry threat changes from 0 to 1, the 
likelihood of including strategic rights would be increased by approximately 15.06%. Similarly, 
based on the results in Column 2 of Table 3, when there is entry threat, the likelihood of 
including strategic rights would be increased by approximately 15.40%. 
In Table 4, when we use “HHI (same type)”, entry threat has a positive and significant effect 
on the adoption of strategic rights in ordered logit specifications, though we do not obtain  
significant results in the logit specification.  
Overall, the above findings in Tables 2-4 support Prediction 1. They are the first set of 
empirical evidence on the adoption of various strategic rights as predicted by the theoretical 
literature on contracts. As shown in Section 2, strategic contracts can help contracting parties to 
extract more rent from potential entrants and mitigate multi-task agency problems, i.e., providing 
more incentive for bio-tech agents to devote effort into contracted R&D projects. When there is 
larger probability of entry threat, benefits from strategic rights would dominate the potential 
contracting and enforcement costs. Correspondingly, strategic rights are more often adopted.  
The other predictions from Tables 2-4 are also intuitive. In particular, in most specifications, 
“client size” has positive and significant effect on the adoption of strategic rights. Larger clients 
tend to enjoy more bargaining power. Thus, it is tempting to argue that larger clients can force 
bio-tech agents to agree on strategic rights. However, when entering into an agreement, the 
inclusion of any term should increase the joint benefit of contracting parties. When an agent 
signs R&D agreement with a larger client, the bio-tech agent would have more concerns about 
hold up problems: for example, the client may try to renegotiation over the contract terms after 
the agent takes effort. Anticipating hold up problems, the agent would have less incentive taking 
effort in the contracted R&D project but spend more time in other R&D activities. In such 
scenarios, the client would have more incentive to include strategic rights in the initial agreement.  
Another prediction from Tables 2-4 is that, if there is “previous relationship” between 
pharmaceutical clients and bio-tech agents, strategic rights are more likely adopted. In theory, the 
effects from previous relationship can be ambiguous. On one hand, with previous relationship, 
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contracting parties would trust each other more and therefore there may be no need to use 
strategic rights. On the other hand, as discussed in Section 2, previous relationship allows for 
information learning. It can also avoid negotiation failure and reduce contracting costs. Thus, 
contracting parties are more likely to reach agreements with strategic rights. Our empirical 
finding suggests that the later effect dominate in the choice of strategic rights.  
Finally, in all specifications, the coefficient on “agent’s R&D experience” is negative and 
significant. When an agent has more previous experience and better reputation, R&D agreements 
tend not to include strategic rights. One possible explanation is that, in order to maintain their 
reputation, such agents have less incentive to deviate to take effort in non-contracted activities. 
As an alternative explanation, agents with more experience have better research ability so that 
the probability for the contracted R&D project to success is larger. Therefore, clients would 
worry less about multi-task problems.  
 
Strategic Right and Termination Right   
Now we turn to the relationship between strategic rights and unconditional termination rights 
held by pharmaceutical clients. Given the theoretical analysis in Section 2, both strategic rights 
and termination rights provide more incentive for agents to take effort in contracted R&D 
activities instead of non-contracted activities. Therefore, these two types of rights should be 
substitutes. Furthermore, Predictions 2.2 and 2.3 state that the above substitution is affected by 
uncertainty in R&D projects and previous relationship between contracting parties.   
Although we use “termination” as an independent variable, we do not mean that there is any 
causality between termination rights and strategic rights. Both contract terms are choice variables 
by contracting parties.   
As constructed in Section 3, “stage” is a proxy for uncertainty: when “stage” changes from 0 
to 1 (later stages of development), there is less uncertainty. In Tables 5 and 6, we test the effect 
on such uncertainty on the relationship between strategic rights and termination rights. To 
capture this effect, we create an interaction variable “termination*stage”.  
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When “previous relationship” equals 1, that indicates clients and agents have cooperated 
before. In Tables 7 and 8, we focus on the effect of previous relationship on the substitution 
between strategic rights and termination rights. We use the interaction variable 
“termination*previous relationship” in the regressions.  
We will use other pharmaceutical firms’ previous “R&D project (same type)” (in Tables 5 
and 7) and previous “clinical trial (same type)” (in Tables 6 and 8) as entry threat measures. We 
do not use the “HHI (same type)” for top generic drugs in this subsection, because the number of 
data observations becomes even smaller.   
In each table, there are three panels. The first panel (columns 1-3) follows logit specifications 
with “strategic right (binary)” as the dependent variable. The second panel (columns 4-6) and the 
third panel (columns 7-9) follow ordered logit specifications with “strategic right 1” and 
“strategic right 2” as the dependent variable respectively. In each panel, we run three regressions: 
The basic regression only controls project characteristics and “termination”; the second 
regression adds the slope dummy, “termination*stage” or “termination*previous relationship”; 
and the last regression extends to include clients’ and agents’ characteristics.  
(Insert Table 5 here) 
(Insert Table 6 here) 
Tables 5 and 6 present the empirical findings about the substitution between strategic rights 
and termination rights, as well as the impact from uncertainty, measured by “stage”. First of all, 
in all specifications, the effect of entry threat measures on the adoption of strategic rights is still 
positive and significant, consistent with Prediction 1. In addition, client size, agent’s R&D 
experience, and previous relationship between contracting parties still have significant effects on 
the adoption of strategic rights, similar to the results in the above subsection (Tables 2-4).  
More importantly, in all specifications, the coefficient of “termination” is negative and 
significant. That is, there is a substitution relationship between unconditional termination right 
held by clients and strategic rights, which supports Prediction 2.1 derived in Section 2. Note that 
this relationship does not mean any causality between the two contract terms.  
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In the logit specification (Columns 2 and 3) of both Table 5 and Table 6, the coefficient of 
“termination*stage” is positive and significant. That is, if an R&D project is involved only with 
earlier stages of development, i.e., with the dummy variable “stage” changing from 1 to 0, the 
substitution between termination and strategic rights becomes more pronounced. This result 
supports Prediction 2.2. The effect is also of economic significance. Based on Column 3 of Table 
5, when “stage” changes from 1 to 0, the negative correlation between termination rights and 
strategic rights is enlarged by about 12.92%. Based on Column 3 of Table 6, when “stage” 
changes from 1 to 0, the negative correlation between termination rights and strategic rights is 
enlarged by about 13.17%. Intuitively, in earlier stages, there is more uncertainty in the R&D 
projects. With more uncertainty, clients are more likely to terminate the project upon observing 
negative signals. Therefore, termination rights become more effective in solving the multi-task 
problem and motivating agents. Correspondingly, potential benefits from strategic rights are 
smaller. As a remark, we do not find similar evidence in the ordered logit specifications, though 
the p-values for the coefficients of “termination*stage” are around 15%.  
(Insert Table 7 here) 
(Insert Table 8 here) 
Tables 7 and 8 present the empirical findings about how previous relationship between 
contracting parties affects the substitution between strategic rights and termination rights. Again, 
in all specifications, the effect of entry threat measures on the adoption of strategic rights is 
positive and significant. Client size, agent’s R&D experience, and previous relationship between 
contracting parties still have significant effects on the adoption of strategic rights.   
In most of the ordered logit specifications (Columns 4-8) of both tables, the coefficient of 
“termination” is negative and significant, implying the substitution relationship between 
unconditional termination rights and strategic rights. However, we do not find significant results 
in the logit specifications (Columns 1-3).   
In both logit and ordered logit specifications of Tables 7 and 8, the coefficient of the slope 
dummy “termination*previous relationship” is negative and significant. That is, if contracting 
parties have previous relationship in R&D cooperation, the substitution between termination and 
strategic rights becomes more pronounced. Based on Column 3 of Table 7, when “previous 
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relationship” changes from 0 to 1, the negative correlation between termination rights and 
strategic rights is enlarged by about 24.68%. Similarly, based on Column 3 of Table 8, when 
“previous relationship” changes from 0 to 1, the negative correlation between termination rights 
and strategic rights is enlarged by about 24.61%. All these figures are of economic significance. 
This result supports Prediction 2.3. As discussed in Section 2, previous relationship allows for 
more information learning between contracting parties. Such information learning allows clients 
to know more about agents’ ability and behavior. Thus, clients are more likely to observe 
intermediate signals about the progress of R&D projects or the signals become more informative. 
In such scenarios, termination rights become more effective in motivating agents to take effort in 
contracted R&D activities. Therefore, potential benefits from strategic rights are smaller.  
To summarize, the empirical results in this section are consistent with predictions from the 
literature on strategic contracts and predictions from the multi-task agency model. In particular, 
contracting parties use strategic rights more often when there is entry threat, when agents have 
less R&D experience, or when clients and agents have previous relationship. This section also 
shows the substitution between strategic rights and termination rights, as well as the impact of 
uncertainty and previous relationship between clients and agents on such substitution. These 
results also imply that firms may not have to include both strategic rights and termination rights 
at the same time.  
 
5. Discussions 
In this section, we first show that the previous empirical findings are robust with alternative 
entry threat measures and then discuss some alternative theories in addition to the multi-task 
moral hazard theory.  
5.1 Robustness with alternative entry threat measures 
In Sections 3 and 4, we have constructed and used entry threat measures based on whether 
other pharmaceutical firms have taken R&D projects or clinical trials of the same disease type in 
all previous years. That is, we have not considered the level of entry threat, which may be related 
with the numbers of previous R&D projects or clinical trials. The numbers of other 
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pharmaceutical firms which have taken R&D project or trials of the same type may also have 
impacts. In this section, we construct the following four alternative entry threat measures to 
check whether the empirical findings are robust or not:  
“Log # of firms (R&D)”, as entry threat measure E1, is the log value of the number of other 
pharmaceutical firms which have done R&D projects of the same disease type in previous years.    
“Log # of firms (Trials)”, as entry threat measure E2, is the log value of the number of other 
pharmaceutical firms which have done clinical trials of the same disease type in previous years.   
“Log # of R&D projects”, as entry threat measure E3, is the log value of the number of other 
pharmaceutical firms’ R&D projects of the same disease type in previous years.    
“Log # of Trials”, as entry threat measure E4, is the log value of the number of other 
pharmaceutical firms’ clinical trials of the same disease type in previous years.   
Using the above entry threat measures, we test all the predictions derived in Section 2 again. 
The results using entry threat measures E1 and E3 are summarized by Tables A1-A6 in the 
Appendix.14 Tables A1 and A2 follow econometric specifications similar to those used in Tables 
2 and 3, testing the effect of entry threat on the adoption of strategic rights. Tables A3 and A4 
follow specifications similar to those in Tables 5 and 6, testing how uncertainty, measured by 
“stage”, affects the substitution between termination rights and strategic rights. Finally, Tables 
A5 and A6 use specifications similar to those in Tables 7 and 8, testing how previous 
relationship between contracting parties influences the substitution between termination rights 
and strategic rights.  
The predictions from empirical analysis using each of the four alternative entry threat 
measures are almost the same as those in Section 4. In particular, in all specifications, the 
coefficients on the entry threat measures are positive and statistically significant, implying that 
strategic rights are more likely adopted when entry threat is larger. In addition, in most 
specifications, we still obtain evidence for the substitution between termination rights and 
strategic rights. There is less significant evidence about the effect from uncertainty on the above 
                                                            
14
 The results using entry threat measures E2 and E4 are similar. The tables of results are available upon request.  
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substitution.15 However, when contracting parties have previous relationship, in all specifications, 
the substitution between termination rights and strategic rights become more pronounced. 
 
5.2 Discussion of Alternative Theories 
In this paper, the first main empirical result is about the relationship between entry threat and 
the adoption of strategic rights. Our theoretical analysis in Section 2 shows that strategic rights 
can not only extract more rent from potential entrants, but also motivate agents to take effort in 
contracted R&D activities. Our theory is consistent with the existing literature.  
For the second result on the negative correlation between termination rights and strategic 
rights, potentially there could be alternative explanations in addition to the multi-task moral 
hazard theory considered in Section 2. As discussed below, these alternative explanations may 
not able to explain the other empirical findings.  
One potential explanation is purely based on uncertainty or likelihood of discoveries without 
moral hazard problems. When the probability of finding contracted discoveries is larger, firms 
may be less likely to adopt termination rights. If the probability of finding non-contracted 
discoveries is larger, firms would have more incentives to use strategic rights. The negative 
correlation between termination rights and strategic rights can be explained if the probability of 
finding contracted discoveries is positively correlated with the probability of finding non-
contracted discoveries. However, in the early stages of drug development, the above two 
probabilities are often negatively correlated. Therefore, the above theory is not consistent with 
the empirical result on the impact of uncertainty (stage): in the earlier stages, the substitution 
between termination rights and strategic rights are more pronounced.  
The screening theory can be used to explain the usage of termination rights when agents have 
private information about their abilities. This theory predicts that only those agents with high 
ability are willing to accept termination rights. Thus, the negative correlation between 
termination rights and strategic rights can be explained if agents with higher ability or expertise 
                                                            
15
 With “Log # of R&D projects” as the entry threat measure, the coefficient of the interaction term 
“termination*stage” is of 15% significance.  
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for contracted R&D activities have smaller chances finding non-contracted discoveries. However, 
this theory would also predict that, when clients and agents have previous relationship and 
therefore face less asymmetric information, the relationship between the two contract rights is 
less negative. This prediction is not consistent with our empirical finding about the impact of 
previous relationship.  
If we consider the long term relationship between clients and agents, the relational contract 
theory is a potential explanation for the negative correlation between termination rights and 
strategic rights. To maintain future cooperation opportunities with clients, agents are more 
willing to accept strategic rights. At the same time, the future cooperation opportunities given by 
clients can motivate agents to take effort in R&D activities. Correspondingly termination right is 
less useful. The relational contract theory is also consistent with the empirical finding about the 
impact of previous relationship. However, in the earlier stages of drug development, there would 
be more future cooperation opportunities. This theory may predict that termination rights would 
be less likely used in the earlier stages. Yet Lerner and Ulrike (2010) show that firms are more 
likely to adopt termination rights if their R&D projects involve earlier stages of drug 
development. 16  
 
6. Conclusion  
This paper has studied the adoption of strategic rights in R&D agreements. In a multi-task 
agency framework, we show that strategic rights not only allow contracting parties to extract 
more rent from potential entrants as shown in the literature, but also mitigate the multi-task 
agency problem by reducing agents’ expected revenue from non-contracted R&D discoveries. In 
addition, strategic rights and termination rights are shown to be substitutes in motivating agents 
to take effort in contracted R&D activities. Then using a rich data set of R&D agreements 
between pharmaceutical clients and bio-tech agents, we find that strategic rights are more likely 
adopted when other pharmaceutical firms may compete for non-contracted discoveries. Strategic 
rights are more likely adopted when agents have less R&D experience and when clients and 
                                                            
16
 We do not intend to conclude for sure that the relational contract theory is not consistent with empirical findings, 
since under this theory there are often multiple equilibria. 
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agents have previous relationship in R&D cooperation. We also find evidence for the substitution 
between strategic rights and unconditional termination rights. This substitution relationship is 
more pronounced when R&D projects have larger uncertainty and/or when clients and agents 
have previous relationship in R&D cooperation.  
There are several directions for future research. For example, it would be desirable to 
investigate how strategic rights affect the success of R&D projects such as patents generated. It 
would also be interesting to examine how entry threat and agency characteristics influence the 
design of other contract terms such as patent allocation in R&D agreements.  
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of the Variables 
Dependent Variables: 0 1 2   
Strategic Right (Binary) 1235 351    
Strategic Right 1 1235 192 159   
Strategic Right 2 1235 210 141   
      
Other Variables 
 
0 1    
Clinical Trial (Same 
Type) 
239 1464    
R&D Project (Same 
Type) 
217 1486    
Termination Right 594 1109    
Stage 756 947    
      
 Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Previous Relationship 1703 0.068702 0.313205 0 4 
Client Size 937 7.130197 3.102532 0.553885 11.65501 
Client ROA 893 0.034918 0.28193 -0.9303 0.359013 
Agent’s R&D 
Experience 
1703 1.810335 2.773229 0 22 
HHI (Same Type) 423 0.285721 0.24684 0 1 
Project Size 1511 73.18822 143.7209 0 953 
Royalty 1244 0.171747 0.171144 0 0.9 
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Table 2: Strategic Rights and Entry Threat Measure 1 (Other Pharmaceutical Firms’ R&D 
Projects of the Same Disease Type) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Strategic Right 
(Binary) 
Strategic 
Right (Binary) 
Strategic 
Right 1 
Strategic 
Right 1 
Strategic 
Right 2 
Strategic 
Right 2  
R&D Project 
(Same Type) 0.776*** 1.192** 0.789*** 1.194** 0.777*** 1.181** 
(0.297) (0.488) (0.296) (0.487) (0.296) (0.487) 
Project Size 0.0014* 0.0007 0.0013* 0.0007 0.0014* 0.0008 
(0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0010) 
Royalty 0.799 0.930 0.849* 1.093* 0.781 1.027 
(0.488) (0.674) (0.478) (0.654) (0.478) (0.651) 
Stage 0.136 -0.026 0.134 -0.015 0.141 0.008 
(0.164) (0.228) (0.162) (0.225) (0.163) (0.224) 
Period 91-00   0.135 0.296 0.033 0.181 0.028 0.209 
(0.212) (0.354) (0.212) (0.355) (0.213) (0.355) 
Period 01-09   0.255 0.635 0.054 0.357 0.073 0.421 
(0.322) (0.468) (0.318) (0.459) (0.317) (0.459) 
Client Size 0.092* 0.103** 0.106** 
(0.049) (0.048) (0.048) 
Client ROA -0.252 -0.351* -0.368* 
(0.211) (0.200) (0.201) 
Agent’s R&D 
Experience -0.204*** -0.196*** -0.195*** 
(0.062) (0.060) (0.060) 
Previous 
Relationship 0.673** 0.862*** 0.868*** 
(0.299) (0.284) (0.281) 
N 1070 555 1070 555 1070 555 
pseudo R-sq 0.025 0.079 0.018 0.065 0.018 0.067 
P- value for 
Ch2 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 
(***: 1% significance; **: 5% significance; *: 10% significance) 
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Table 3: Strategic Rights and Entry Threat Measure 2 (Other Pharmaceutical Firms’ 
Clinical Trials of the Same Disease Type) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Strategic Right 
(Binary) 
Strategic 
Right 
(Binary) 
Strategic 
Right 1 
Strategic 
Right 1 
Strategic 
Right 2 
Strategic 
Right 2  
Clinical Trial 
(Same Type) 0.681** 1.228** 0.689** 1.232** 0.676** 1.219** 
(0.273) (0.486) (0.273) (0.486) (0.273) (0.486) 
Project Size 0.0013 0.0008 0.0013* 0.0007 0.0014* 0.0008 
(0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0010) 
Royalty 0.813* 0.918 0.866* 1.082* 0.799* 1.016 
(0.488) (0.675) (0.477) (0.655) (0.477) (0.651) 
Stage 0.146 -0.025 0.144 -0.014 0.151 0.009 
(0.164) (0.228) (0.162) (0.225) (0.162) (0.224) 
Period 91-00   0.088 0.270 -0.014 0.153 -0.017 0.182 
(0.213) (0.355) (0.213) (0.356) (0.213) (0.355) 
Period 01-09   0.210 0.607 0.0104 0.327 0.0311 0.393 
(0.322) (0.468) (0.318) (0.459) (0.317) (0.459) 
Client Size 0.0923* 0.103** 0.105** 
(0.049) (0.048) (0.048) 
Client ROA -0.255 -0.354* -0.370* 
(0.212) (0.201) (0.203) 
Agent’s R&D 
Experience -0.204*** -0.196*** -0.195*** 
(0.062) (0.060) (0.060) 
Previous 
Relationship 0.672** 0.861*** 0.867*** 
(0.298) (0.284) (0.281) 
N 1070 555 1070 555 1070 555 
pseudo R-sq 0.024 0.080 0.018 0.066 0.017 0.068 
P- value for 
Ch2 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 
(***: 1% significance; **: 5% significance; *: 10% significance) 
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Table 4: Strategic Rights and Entry Threat Measure 3 (HHI for the Generic Drug Market 
of the Same Disease Type) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Strategic Right 
(Binary) 
Strategic Right 
(Binary) 
Strategic 
Right 1 
Strategic 
Right 1 
Strategic 
Right 2 
Strategic 
Right 2  
HHI (Same 
Type) 0.661 1.376 0.644 1.406* 0.677 1.406* 
(0.637) (0.895) (0.612) (0.825) (0.612) (0.825) 
Project Size 0.0018* 0.0013 0.0020** 0.0012 0.0021** 0.0012 
(0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0012) 
Royalty -0.723 0.373 -0.882 0.193 -0.870 0.193 
(1.186) (1.488) (1.170) (1.453) (1.173) (1.453) 
Stage 0.112 -0.454 0.138 -0.340 0.159 -0.340 
(0.435) (0.561) (0.432) (0.546) (0.433) (0.546) 
Client Size 0.105 0.163 0.163 
(0.132) (0.129) (0.129) 
Client ROA -0.939 -1.294* -1.294* 
(0.668) (0.673) (0.673) 
Agent’s R&D 
Experience -0.269** -0.277** -0.277** 
(0.118) (0.116) (0.116) 
Previous 
Relationship 1.120** 1.550*** 1.550*** 
(0.514) (0.464) (0.464) 
N 159 102 159 102 159 102 
pseudo R-sq 0.026 0.140 0.024 0.172 0.025 0.172 
P- value for 
Ch2 0.303 0.0189 0.218 0.0000 0.192 0.0002 
(***: 1% significance; **: 5% significance; *: 10% significance) Timing dummies are controlled.  
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Table 5: Substitution between Strategic and Termination Rights, and Impact from Uncertainty, with Entry Measure 1 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Strategic 
Right (Binary) 
Strategic 
Right (Binary) 
Strategic 
Right (Binary) 
Strategic 
Right 1 
Strategic 
Right 1 
Strategic 
Right 1 
Strategic 
Right 2 
Strategic 
Right 2 
Strategic 
Right 2 
R&D Project (Same 
Type) 0.789*** 0.814*** 1.253** 0.801*** 0.823*** 1.238** 0.788*** 0.807*** 1.221** 
(0.298) (0.299) (0.493) (0.297) (0.298) (0.492) (0.297) (0.298) (0.492) 
Project Size 0.0013 0.0012 0.0007 0.0012 0.0010 0.0007 0.0013* 0.0010 0.0007 
(0.00081) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.00081) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0012) 
Royalty 0.747 0.766 0.917 0.779* 0.814* 1.059 0.721 0.753 1.014 
(0.490) (0.491) (0.682) (0.481) (0.482) (0.663) (0.480) (0.481) (0.659) 
Stage 0.150 -0.390 -0.516 0.152 -0.376 -0.417 0.160 -0.345 -0.369 
(0.165) (0.282) (0.386) (0.163) (0.278) (0.375) (0.163) (0.278) (0.375) 
Termination  -0.306* -0.723*** -0.831** -0.358** -0.765*** -0.824** -0.364** -0.751*** -0.794** 
(0.162) (0.238) (0.340) (0.161) (0.236) (0.333) (0.161) (0.236) (0.333) 
Previous Relationship 0.145 0.635** 0.308 0.807*** 0.318 0.816*** 
(0.227) (0.300) (0.220) (0.284) (0.220) (0.281) 
Termination*Stage 0.782** 0.752* 0.778** 0.644 0.744** 0.606 
(0.328) (0.456) (0.324) (0.446) (0.324) (0.446) 
Client Size 0.091* 0.102** 0.104** 
(0.050) (0.049) (0.049) 
Client ROA -0.259 -0.358* -0.374* 
(0.218) (0.208) (0.210) 
Agent’s Experience -0.200*** -0.192*** -0.191*** 
(0.063) (0.061) (0.061) 
N 1070 1070 555 1070 1070 555 1070 1070 555 
pseudo R-sq 0.028 0.034 0.088 0.022 0.027 0.073 0.022 0.026 0.074 
P- value for Ch2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(***: 1% significance; **: 5% significance; *: 10% significance) Timing dummies are controlled.  
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Table 6: Substitution between Strategic and Termination Rights, and Impact from Uncertainty, with Entry Measure 2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Strategic 
Right (Binary) 
Strategic 
Right (Binary) 
Strategic 
Right (Binary) 
Strategic 
Right 1 
Strategic 
Right 1 
Strategic 
Right 1 
Strategic 
Right 2 
Strategic 
Right 2 
Strategic 
Right 2 
Clinical Trial (Same 
Type) 0.683** 0.708*** 1.297*** 0.688** 0.713*** 1.287*** 0.675** 0.696** 1.268*** 
(0.274) (0.275) (0.492) (0.273) (0.274) (0.491) (0.273) (0.274) (0.491) 
Project Size 0.0013 0.00113 0.0007 0.0012 0.0010 0.0007 0.0013* 0.0010 0.0007 
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0010) 
Royalty 0.764 0.783 0.904 0.798* 0.835* 1.047 0.741 0.775* 1.003 
(0.489) (0.491) (0.683) (0.480) (0.481) (0.664) (0.479) (0.480) (0.660) 
Stage 0.160 -0.378 -0.526 0.162 -0.366 -0.428 0.169 -0.334 -0.378 
(0.165) (0.281) (0.386) (0.163) (0.277) (0.375) (0.163) (0.277) (0.375) 
Termination  -0.295* -0.711*** -0.844** -0.348** -0.754*** -0.838** -0.354** -0.740*** -0.806** 
(0.162) (0.238) (0.341) (0.161) (0.235) (0.334) (0.161) (0.235) (0.333) 
Previous Relationship 0.153 0.634** 0.316 0.807*** 0.326 0.815*** 
(0.227) (0.300) (0.220) (0.284) (0.220) (0.281) 
Termination*Stage 0.783** 0.767* 0.778** 0.661 0.743** 0.620 
(0.328) (0.457) (0.324) (0.446) (0.324) (0.447) 
Client Size 0.090* 0.101** 0.103** 
(0.050) (0.049) (0.049) 
Client ROA -0.263 -0.362* -0.378* 
(0.221) (0.210) (0.212) 
Agent’s Experience -0.201*** -0.192*** -0.192*** 
(0.063) (0.061) (0.061) 
N 1070 1070 555 1070 1070 555 1070 1070 555 
pseudo R-sq 0.027 0.033 0.090 0.021 0.026 0.074 0.021 0.025 0.075 
P- value for Ch2 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.00001 0.0000 0.0000 
(***: 1% significance; **: 5% significance; *: 10% significance) Timing dummies are controlled.  
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Table 7: Substitution between Strategic and Termination Rights, and Impact of Previous Relationship, with Entry Measure 1  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Strategic 
Right (Binary) 
Strategic 
Right (Binary) 
Strategic 
Right (Binary) 
Strategic 
Right 1 
Strategic 
Right 1 
Strategic 
Right 1 
Strategic 
Right 2 
Strategic 
Right 2 
Strategic 
Right 2 
R&D Proj (Same Type) 0.789*** 0.806*** 1.249** 0.801*** 0.812*** 1.247** 0.788*** 0.801*** 1.236** 
(0.298) (0.298) (0.491) (0.297) (0.297) (0.491) (0.297) (0.297) (0.491) 
Project Size 0.0013 0.0010 0.0004 0.0012 0.0008 0.0004 0.0013* 0.0008 0.0004 
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0010) 
Royalty 0.747 0.718 0.787 0.779* 0.757 0.936 0.721 0.703 0.900 
(0.490) (0.491) (0.681) (0.481) (0.482) (0.661) (0.480) (0.481) (0.656) 
Stage 0.150 0.133 -0.0327 0.152 0.140 -0.0118 0.160 0.148 0.0133 
(0.165) (0.165) (0.230) (0.163) (0.164) (0.226) (0.163) (0.164) (0.226) 
Termination  -0.306* -0.228 -0.312 -0.358** -0.266* -0.368* -0.364** -0.267* -0.348 
(0.162) (0.167) (0.231) (0.161) (0.166) (0.228) (0.161) (0.166) (0.227) 
Previous Relationship 0.455 1.005** 0.617** 1.117*** 0.653** 1.171*** 
(0.305) (0.420) (0.287) (0.368) (0.288) (0.371) 
Termination*Previous 
Relationship -1.221** -1.497* -1.284** -1.453* -1.351** -1.597* 
(0.615) (0.852) (0.605) (0.822) (0.605) (0.825) 
Client Size 0.101** 0.111** 0.113** 
(0.050) (0.048) (0.049) 
Client ROA -0.244 -0.345* -0.360* 
(0.218) (0.207) (0.208) 
Agent’s Experience -0.207*** -0.196*** -0.196*** 
(0.064) (0.061) (0.062) 
N 1070 1070 555 1070 1070 555 1070 1070 555 
pseudo R-sq 0.028 0.033 0.091 0.022 0.026 0.076 0.022 0.027 0.078 
P- value for Ch2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(***: 1% significance; **: 5% significance; *: 10% significance) Timing dummies are controlled.  
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Table 8: Substitution between Strategic and Termination Rights, and Impact of Previous Relationship, with Entry Measure 2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Strategic 
Right (Binary) 
Strategic 
Right (Binary) 
Strategic 
Right (Binary) 
Strategic 
Right 1 
Strategic 
Right 1 
Strategic 
Right 1 
Strategic 
Right 2 
Strategic 
Right 2 
Strategic 
Right 2 
Clinical Trial (Same Type) 0.683** 0.695** 1.285*** 0.688** 0.696** 1.288*** 0.675** 0.683** 1.275*** 
(0.274) (0.274) (0.490) (0.273) (0.273) (0.489) (0.273) (0.273) (0.490) 
Project Size 0.0013 0.0010 0.0004 0.0012 0.0008 0.0004 0.0013* 0.0009 0.0004 
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0010) 
Royalty 0.764 0.733 0.774 0.798* 0.775* 0.924 0.741 0.721 0.888 
(0.489) (0.491) (0.682) (0.480) (0.481) (0.662) (0.479) (0.480) (0.657) 
Stage 0.160 0.145 -0.0316 0.162 0.150 -0.0111 0.169 0.158 0.0142 
(0.165) (0.165) (0.230) (0.163) (0.163) (0.226) (0.163) (0.163) (0.226) 
Termination  -0.295* -0.218 -0.316 -0.348** -0.257 -0.373* -0.354** -0.258* -0.352 
(0.162) (0.167) (0.232) (0.161) (0.166) (0.228) (0.161) (0.156) (0.228) 
Previous Relationship 0.457 1.003** 0.619** 1.115*** 0.655** 1.170*** 
(0.305) (0.419) (0.287) (0.368) (0.288) (0.371) 
Termination*Previous 
Relationship -1.204* -1.496* -1.263** -1.452* -1.331** -1.597* 
(0.614) (0.852) (0.605) (0.822) (0.605) (0.825) 
Client Size 0.100** 0.111** 0.113** 
(0.050) (0.048) (0.049) 
Client ROA -0.247 -0.349* -0.364* 
(0.220) (0.209) (0.210) 
Agent’s Experience -0.207*** -0.196*** -0.196*** 
(0.064) (0.061) (0.062) 
N 1070 1070 555 1070 1070 555 1070 1070 555 
pseudo R-sq 0.027 0.032 0.092 0.021 0.025 0.077 0.021 0.026 0.079 
P- value for Ch2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(***: 1% significance; **: 5% significance; *: 10% significance) Timing dummies are controlled. 
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Appendix:  
Table A1: Strategic Rights and Entry Threat Measure A1 “Log # of Firms (R&D)” 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Strategic Right 
(Binary) 
Strategic 
Right (Binary) 
Strategic 
Right 1 
Strategic 
Right 1 
Strategic 
Right 2 
Strategic 
Right 2  
Log # of firms 
(R&D) 
0.128** 0.182** 0.132*** 0.185** 0.131*** 0.185** 
(0.051) (0.077) (0.051) (0.076) (0.051) (0.076) 
Project Size 
0.0013 0.0007 0.0012 0.0006 0.0013* 0.0007 
(0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0010) 
Royalty 
0.777 0.926 0.823* 1.094* 0.758 1.027 
(0.488) (0.671) (0.478) (0.650) (0.477) (0.648) 
Stage 
0.121 -0.036 0.119 -0.024 0.126 -0.004 
(0.164) (0.228) (0.163) (0.225) (0.163) (0.224) 
Client Size 
 0.090*  0.101**  0.103** 
 (0.049)  (0.048)  (0.048) 
Client ROA 
 -0.235  -0.334*  -0.351* 
 (0.207)  (0.197)  (0.199) 
Agent’s R&D 
Experience 
 -0.209***  -0.200***  -0.200*** 
 (0.062)  (0.060)  (0.060) 
Previous 
Relationship 
 0.668**  0.854***  0.861*** 
 (0.303)  (0.286)  (0.283) 
N 
1069 555 1069 555 1069 555 
pseudo R-sq 
0.024 0.077 0.018 0.064 0.018 0.066 
P- value for 
Ch2 
0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 
(***: 1% significance; **: 5% significance; *: 11% significance) Timing dummies are controlled.  
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Table A2: Strategic Rights and Entry Threat Measure A3 “Log # of R&D Projects” 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Strategic 
Right 
(Binary) 
Strategic 
Right (Binary) 
Strategic 
Right 1 
Strategic 
Right 1 
Strategic 
Right 2 
Strategic 
Right 2  
Log # of R&D 
Projects 
0.105** 0.153** 0.110** 0.156** 0.109** 0.156** 
(0.049) (0.0671) (0.045) (0.067) (0.045) (0.067) 
Project Size 
0.0013 0.0007 0.0012 0.0007 0.0013* 0.0007 
(0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0010) 
Royalty 
0.790* 0.929 0.833* 1.091* 0.768* 1.025 
(0.487) (0.670) (0.477) (0.650) (0.477) (0.647) 
Stage 
0.125 -0.034 0.123 -0.023 0.130 -0.003 
(0.164) (0.228) (0.163) (0.225) (0.163) (0.225) 
Client Size 
 0.091*  0.102**  0.105** 
 (0.049)  (0.048)  (0.048) 
Client ROA 
 -0.235  -0.335*  -0.351* 
 (0.207)  (0.197)  (0.198) 
Agent’s R&D 
Experience 
 -0.208***  -0.200***  -0.200*** 
 (0.062)  (0.060)  (0.060) 
Previous 
Relationship 
 0.668**  0.854***  0.860*** 
 (0.303)  (0.287)  (0.283) 
N 
1070 555 1070 555 1070 555 
pseudo R-sq 
0.024 0.076 0.017 0.063 0.017 0.065 
P- value for 
Ch2 
0.0002 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 
(***: 1% significance; **: 5% significance; *: 11% significance) Timing dummies are controlled. 
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Table A3: Substitution between Strategic and Termination Rights, and Impact from Uncertainty, with Entry Measure E1             
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Strategic 
Right (Binary) 
Strategic 
Right (Binary) 
Strategic 
Right (Binary) 
Strategic 
Right 1 
Strategic 
Right 1 
Strategic 
Right 1 
Strategic 
Right 2 
Strategic 
Right 2 
Strategic 
Right 2 
Log # of firms (R&D)  0.132*** 0.134*** 0.194** 0.135*** 0.135*** 0.191** 0.135*** 0.135*** 0.193** 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.078) (0.051) (0.051) (0.077) (0.051) (0.051) (0.077) 
Project Size 0.0012 0.0011 0.0006 0.0011 0.0009 0.0006 0.0012 0.0009 0.0006 
 (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0010) 
Royalty 0.721 0.737 0.903 0.748 0.782* 1.057* 0.693 0.724 1.009 
 (0.490) (0.491) (0.679) (0.481) (0.482) (0.659) (0.480) (0.481) (0.656) 
Stage 0.135 -0.399 -0.509 0.138 -0.377 -0.403 0.146 -0.348 -0.361 
 (0.165) (0.282) (0.385) (0.163) (0.278) (0.375) (0.163) (0.278) (0.375) 
Termination  -0.314* -0.727*** -0.828** -0.366** -0.762*** -0.811** -0.374** -0.752*** -0.791** 
 (0.163) (0.238) (0.339) (0.161) (0.236) (0.333) (0.161) (0.235) (0.332) 
Previous Relationship  0.131 0.628**  0.294 0.798***  0.304 0.807*** 
  (0.228) (0.305)  (0.221) (0.287)  (0.220) (0.283) 
Termination*Stage  0.774** 0.728*  0.759** 0.613  0.728** 0.581 
  (0.328) (0.456)  (0.324) (0.446)  (0.324) (0.446) 
Client Size   0.087*   0.099**   0.101** 
   (0.050)   (0.049)   (0.049) 
Client ROA   -0.240   -0.339*   -0.356* 
   (0.215)   (0.205)   (0.208) 
Agent’s Experience   -0.205***   -0.197***   -0.197*** 
   (0.063)   (0.061)   (0.061) 
N 1069 1069 555 1069 1069 555 1069 1069 555 
pseudo R-sq 0.027 0.032 0.086 0.021 0.026 0.072 0.021 0.026 0.073 
P- value for Ch2 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
(***: 1% significance; **: 5% significance; *: 11% significance) Timing dummies are controlled.  
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Table A4: Substitution between Strategic and Termination Rights, and Impact from Uncertainty, with Entry Measure E3 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Strategic 
Right (Binary) 
Strategic 
Right (Binary) 
Strategic 
Right (Binary) 
Strategic 
Right 1 
Strategic 
Right 1 
Strategic 
Right 1 
Strategic 
Right 2 
Strategic 
Right 2 
Strategic 
Right 2 
Log # of R&D Projects  0.109** 0.110** 0.163** 0.113** 0.112** 0.161** 0.112** 0.111** 0.162** 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.068) (0.045) (0.045) (0.067) (0.045) (0.045) (0.067) 
Project Size 0.0012 0.0011 0.0006 0.0012 0.0009 0.0006 0.0012 0.0010 0.0006 
 (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0010) 
Royalty 0.734 0.751 0.906 0.759 0.794* 1.054* 0.704 0.736 1.006 
 (0.490) (0.491) (0.679) (0.481) (0.481) (0.659) (0.480) (0.481) (0.656) 
Stage 0.139 -0.387 -0.498 0.142 -0.365 -0.393 0.149 -0.336 -0.351 
 (0.165) (0.281) (0.385) (0.163) (0.278) (0.374) (0.163) (0.278) (0.374) 
Termination  -0.311* -0.717*** -0.820** -0.363** -0.752*** -0.804** -0.371** -0.742*** -0.784** 
 (0.162) (0.238) (0.339) (0.161) (0.235) (0.332) (0.161) (0.235) (0.332) 
Previous Relationship  0.132 0.628**  0.295 0.798***  0.305 0.806*** 
  (0.228) (0.305)  (0.221) (0.287)  (0.220) (0.283) 
Termination*Stage  0.764** 0.715  0.748** 0.601  0.717** 0.568 
  (0.327) (0.455)  (0.323) (0.445)  (0.323) (0.446) 
Client Size   0.089*   0.100**   0.102** 
   (0.050)   (0.049)   (0.049) 
Client ROA   -0.239   -0.339*   -0.355* 
   (0.214)   (0.205)   (0.207) 
Agent’s Experience   -0.204***   -0.197***   -0.196*** 
   (0.063)   (0.061)   (0.061) 
N 1070 1070 555 1070 1070 555 1070 1070 555 
pseudo R-sq 0.027 0.032 0.085 0.021 0.025 0.071 0.021 0.025 0.073 
P- value for Ch2 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
(***: 1% significance; **: 5% significance; *: 11% significance) Timing dummies are controlled.  
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Table A5: Substitution between Strategic and Termination Rights, and Impact of Previous Relationship, with Entry Measure E1 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Strategic 
Right (Binary) 
Strategic 
Right (Binary) 
Strategic 
Right (Binary) 
Strategic 
Right 1 
Strategic 
Right 1 
Strategic 
Right 1 
Strategic 
Right 2 
Strategic 
Right 2 
Strategic 
Right 2 
Log # of firms (R&D)  0.132*** 0.131*** 0.188** 0.135*** 0.133*** 0.187** 0.135*** 0.133*** 0.189** 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.077) (0.051) (0.051) (0.076) (0.051) (0.051) (0.076) 
Project Size 0.0012 0.0009 0.0004 0.0011 0.0007 0.0004 0.0012 0.0007 0.0004 
 (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0010) 
Royalty 0.721 0.694 0.789 0.748 0.729 0.949 0.693 0.677 0.909 
 (0.490) (0.491) (0.677) (0.481) (0.482) (0.657) (0.480) (0.481) (0.653) 
Stage 0.135 0.119 -0.039 0.138 0.127 -0.017 0.146 0.134 0.007 
 (0.165) (0.166) (0.230) (0.163) (0.164) (0.226) (0.163) (0.164) (0.226) 
Termination  -0.314* -0.240 -0.330 -0.366** -0.277* -0.380* -0.374** -0.280* -0.366* 
 (0.163) (0.167) (0.232) (0.161) (0.166) (0.228) (0.161) (0.166) (0.228) 
Previous Relationship  0.428 0.976**  0.591** 1.087***  0.626** 1.140*** 
  (0.306) (0.423)  (0.287) (0.370)  (0.288) (0.372) 
Termination*Previous 
Relationship 
 -1.184* -1.418*  -1.247** -1.372*  -1.313** -1.518* 
  (0.615) (0.858)  (0.606) (0.827)  (0.606) (0.830) 
Client Size   0.097*   0.107**   0.110** 
   (0.050)   (0.048)   (0.048) 
Client ROA   -0.225   -0.327*   -0.343* 
   (0.214)   (0.204)   (0.206) 
Agent’s Experience   -0.211***   -0.201***   -0.201*** 
   (0.064)   (0.061)   (0.062) 
N 1069 1069 555 1069 1069 555 1069 1069 555 
pseudo R-sq 0.027 0.031 0.088 0.021 0.025 0.074 0.021 0.026 0.077 
P- value for Ch2 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
 (***: 1% significance; **: 5% significance; *: 11% significance) Timing dummies are controlled.  
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Table A6: Substitution between Strategic and Termination Rights, and Impact of Previous Relationship, with Entry MeasureE3 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Strategic 
Right (Binary) 
Strategic 
Right (Binary) 
Strategic 
Right (Binary) 
Strategic 
Right 1 
Strategic 
Right 1 
Strategic 
Right 1 
Strategic 
Right 2 
Strategic 
Right 2 
Strategic 
Right 2 
Log # of R&D Projects  0.109** 0.108** 0.159** 0.113** 0.111** 0.159** 0.112** 0.110** 0.160** 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.067) (0.045) (0.045) (0.067) (0.045) (0.045) (0.067) 
Project Size 0.0012 0.0009 0.0004 0.0012 0.0007 0.0004 0.0012 0.0008 0.0004 
 (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0010) 
Royalty 0.734 0.708 0.792 0.759 0.741 0.947 0.704 0.689 0.907 
 (0.490) (0.491) (0.676) (0.481) (0.481) (0.656) (0.480) (0.481) (0.653) 
Stage 0.139 0.123 -0.037 0.142 0.131 -0.015 0.149 0.138 0.008 
 (0.165) (0.166) (0.230) (0.163) (0.164) (0.226) (0.163) (0.164) (0.226) 
Termination  -0.311* -0.236 -0.329 -0.363** -0.274* -0.380* -0.371** -0.277* -0.366* 
 (0.162) (0.167) (0.232) (0.161) (0.166) (0.228) (0.161) (0.166) (0.228) 
Previous Relationship  0.431 0.979**  0.592** 1.088***  0.628** 1.141*** 
  (0.306) (0.424)  (0.287) (0.370)  (0.288) (0.373) 
Termination*Previous 
Relationship 
 -1.185* -1.424*  -1.247** -1.373*  -1.314** -1.520* 
  (0.615) (0.858)  (0.606) (0.827)  (0.606) (0.830) 
Client Size   0.098**   0.109**   0.111** 
   (0.050)   (0.048)   (0.048) 
Client ROA   -0.225   -0.327*   -0.343* 
   (0.214)   (0.204)   (0.205) 
Agent’s Experience   -0.211***   -0.200***   -0.201*** 
   (0.064)   (0.061)   (0.062) 
N 1070 1070 555 1070 1070 555 1070 1070 555 
pseudo R-sq 0.027 0.031 0.087 0.021 0.025 0.073 0.021 0.026 0.076 
P- value for Ch2 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
(***: 1% significance; **: 5% significance; *: 11% significance) Timing dummies are controlled. 
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